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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
COMPETITION POLICY IN KOREA 
KYU UCK LEE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the era of rapid economic growth that occurred in Korea 
from 1981 to 1999, the Korean government gave higher priority to large 
firms over small and medium-sized firms. This policy, coupled with 
economies of scale inherent in imported technologies, led to the 
concentration of economic power embodied in and symbolized by 
conglomerate business groups popularly known as chaebols.1 Chaebol 
subsidiaries often are monopolists or oligopolists in their respective 
markets. Chaebols are owned and controlled by individuals and their 
immediate family members.2 Most chaebols are based in the Korean 
manufacturing sector; however, many have expanded their activities into 
the financial sector as well.3  
Korea’s market structure generally was noncompetitive until 
competition policy issues surfaced after the Korean oil crisis of 1974. The 
severely distorted market mechanism and a sharp increase in the price of 
imported raw materials caused rampant inflation and supply-demand 
imbalances in many markets. To control prices and assure fair trade 
practices, the Korean government enacted the Act Concerning Price 
Stabilization and Fair Trade (“Price Stabilization Act”). Government 
implementation of the Price Stabilization Act lopsidedly stressed price 
   Professor of Economics, College of Business Administration, Ajou University, Korea. 
 1. For example, in 1997, the thirty largest chaebols accounted for 21% of total employment and 
32% of total sales in the manufacturing sector. For time series data on the economic performance of 
chaebols, see KYU UCK LEE, COMPETITION POLICY, DEREGULATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE (1998). Korean chaebols have a number of characteristics similar to those 
of the pre-World War II Japanese zaibatsu. (After all, these two words are written in the same Chinese 
characters with only different pronunciations.) Critics have lambasted chaebols for their close ties with 
politics, questionable business ethics, and inefficient diversification while simultaneously crediting 
them for their contributions to economic growth. These complex characteristics have caused 
ambivalent public attitudes and government policies toward chaebols. 
 2. In 2000, the average “in-group shareholding ratio” of the thirty largest chaebols was 43.4%. 
Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, The White Paper on Fair Trade 82 (2001) [hereinafter KFTC]. 
 3. Chaebols took over Korea’s previously nationalized commercial banks in 1981. Only a few 
chaebols shared ownership of each national bank because no single “person” was permitted to own 
more than 8% of any nationwide commercial bank’s total stock. By contrast, there was no legal ceiling 
on the ownership of local banks, thereby allowing each local bank to come under the practical control 
of one or two chaebols. 
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control. From 1975 to 1979, the government designated hundreds of 
monopolistic and oligopolistic products as targets for price control.4 
Although the number of designated products gradually decreased, the 
government carried out extensive price regulation until 1979.5  
The extensive government price controls severely distorted price 
mechanisms and gave rise to phenomena such as dual pricing, 
deterioration of product quality, excess demand, and increased uncertainty 
about future price movement, thereby underlying the general consensus 
that the market mechanism should play a greater future role in the Korean 
economy. The government’s first major effort in this direction was to 
enact the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“Fair Trade Act”) on 
December 31, 1980. The Fair Trade Act essentially replaced the Price 
Stabilization Act by creating a comprehensive set of new rules for the 
market economy—namely, free and fair competition. Nevertheless, the 
Fair Trade Act did not specifically address chaebols.6 
II. THE FAIR TRADE ACT 
The Fair Trade Act forbids dominant firms in monopolistic or 
oligopolistic markets from abusing their market dominating positions.7 
Each year from 1981 to 1999, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) 
officially identified such monopolistic and oligopolisic firms.8 The KFTC 
exerted tremendous administrative efforts to identify these firms, but was 
only able to correct thirty-three cases of such abuse.9 
In 1999, Korea amended the Fair Trade Act to abolish prior designation 
and identify whether or not the defendant firm has a market dominating 
position.10 The Fair Trade Act originally was designed to generally restrict 
business integration by firms if the integration could lead to substantial 
injury to competition in any line of commerce (with exceptions only for 
 4. See LEE, supra note 1, at 237-40. 
 5. Almost all of the eighty-five cases prosecuted on charges of unfair business practices 
concerned the hoarding and cornering of rice. The only case of undue concerted activity involved a 
cement cartel. Ironically, however, the Price Stabilization Act served not to sanction the cement cartel 
but to legitimize it on four consecutive occasions. 
 6. Numerous subsequent amendments to the Fair Trade Act corrected many such omissions. 
 7. Market dominating firms refer to either any single firm that has a market share of more than 
50% or the three largest firms in a given market that have a combined market share of more than 75%. 
See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Law No. 3320 of 1980, art. 4, available at 
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Korea/Competition/krcom02.html [hereinafter Fair Trade Act]. 
 8. For example, in 1981, the KFTC identified 102 such firms in 42 markets; in 1999, it 
identified 324 firms in 129 markets.  
 9. See KFTC, supra note 2, at 498-99.   
 10. See Fair Trade Act, Law No. 3320 of 1980, amended by Law No. 5813 of 1999. 
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integration aimed at either industrial rationalization or strengthening the 
international competitiveness of an industry). In 1999, Korea replaced 
these ambiguous exemptions with the efficiencies and failing-firm defense 
similar to those found in the 1992 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines.11 
When Korea originally designed the Fair Trade Act in 1980, it identified 
the “establishment of new enterprises” as a method of business integration 
to complement the typical methods of business integration like mergers 
and acquisitions.12 This provision was unique compared to the competition 
laws of many other countries, and it was made in response to the fact that 
more firms were newly established than currently were merged into the 
rapidly growing Korean economy.13 
The Fair Trade Act provides specific measures that mitigate the 
concentration of economic power in big business groups. The government 
amended the Fair Trade Act in 1999 to permit the existence of holding 
companies with certain restrictions as a means to induce chaebols to 
reorganize themselves.14 The Fair Trade Act states that “financial” holding 
companies cannot possess subsidiaries positioned outside the financial 
sector while “general” holding companies cannot have subsidiaries 
engaged in financial business.15 The philosophy underlying this dichotomy 
is that financial capital must be separated from industrial capital in order 
to prevent chaebols from dominating the national economy.  
The Fair Trade Act prohibits direct cross-investment between 
subsidiaries belonging to the same chaebol.16 However, most chaebols 
have circumvented this restriction by expanding through indirect cross-
shareholdings among subsidiaries, which can take or assume any 
combination of the radial, circular, or matrix forms.17 Because it is 
difficult to disentangle the complicated web of indirect cross-shareholding, 
the 1986 amendment to the Fair Trade Act added a clause prohibiting 
subsidiaries of large business groups from obtaining or holding shares in 
other domestic firms worth more 40% of the firm’s net assets.18 The 1994 
 11. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Fed. Reg. 
41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992). 
 12. In 1986, Korea expanded the category “business integration” to include “the participation in 
the establishment of new enterprises” so as to include joint ventures within the purview of the Fair 
Trade Act. See Fair Trade Act art. 12(5). 
 13. See LEE, supra note 1, at 275. 
 14. See Fair Trade Act art. 8. 
 15. Id. art. 8-2(1), paras. 4-5. 
 16. Id. art. 9(1). 
 17. For example, in 1984, the average intercompany shareholding ratio for the thirty largest 
business groups was 47%. 
 18. The Fair Trade Act originally applied this provision to business groups whose total assets 
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amendment subsequently lowered this ceiling to 25%.19 Chaebol 
subsidiaries that engage in either banking or insurance also are subject to 
this constraint and are prohibited from exercising voting rights in domestic 
firms they have invested in.20  
To further control chaebols, the Fair Trade Act restricts affiliate cross 
debt guarantees between subsidiaries belonging to any one of the thirty 
largest chaebols.21 The 1992 amendment to the Fair Trade Act restricted 
these affiliate payment guarantees to 200% of the subsidiaries’ net assets, 
with the 1996 amendment lowering this restriction to 100%. Finally, under 
the 1998 amendment, the Fair Trade Act now prohibits affiliate payment 
guarantees for all new borrowings of the thirty largest chaebols.22 Before 
these restrictions, chaebols had easy access to banks because the chaebol 
subsidiaries would have other affiliates guarantee the chaebols’ debts 
under the collateral-based loan system, thus disproportionately favoring 
the chaebols and fueling their rapid expansion. The government expects 
the current ban on affiliate payment guarantees to redirect the flow of 
capital to other firms in a more balanced manner. However, it is an open 
question as to whether such a result will occur if banks do not abandon 
their conservative practice of “no collateral, no loan.”23 
The Fair Trade Act prohibits firms and cartels from engaging in 
collective activities that would restrict competition substantially in any 
line of commerce.24 The 1990 amendment added a supplementary 
provision of presumption based on circumstantial evidence, under which 
covert collaborations can be brought within the ambit of the Fair Trade 
Act.25 However, the KFTC retained the power to keep alive cartels deemed 
necessary for achieving industrial rationalization, overcoming cyclical 
exceeded 400 billion won (approximately 311 million U.S. dollars). However, since 1993, the Korean 
government has applied this provision solely to the thirty largest chaebols. 
 19. See Fair Trade Act art. 10(1). 
 20. The government rescinded this provision in 1998 but decided to reinstate it in 1999 because 
chaebols had taken advantage of the provision’s absence by increasing their share of ownership in 
their subsidiaries from 38% to 44% in less than one year, thereby reviving fears of rampant chaebol 
expansion. Regardless of the reasons for removing and then dramatically reintroducing the provision, 
such a seemingly wayward policy change undermined public trust in the Korean government’s ability 
to properly address the chaebol issue. 
 21. See Fair Trade Act art. 10-2. 
 22. Id. 
 23. In Korea, commercial banks stubbornly have maintained the policy of not lending money to 
firms that cannot submit collateral equivalent to the whole amount of loans. Consequently, small and 
independent firms have had very limited access to commercial banks. See KOREA ECON. RESEARCH 
INST., COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE GLOBALIZATION AND INFORMATION AGE 36-37 (2001). 
 24. By 2000, the government had remedied 329 such prohibited collective activities. KFTC, 
supra note 2, at 511. 
 25. See Fair Trade Act art. 14-3. 
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recessions, facilitating industrial restructuring, enhancing the competitive 
strength of small and medium-sized firms, and rationalizing transaction 
terms.26 The Fair Trade Act also prohibits firms and cartels from engaging 
in seven broad categories of unfair business practices: (1) the undue 
refusal to transact with or discriminate against a certain partner in the 
transaction; (2) the undue elimination of competitors; (3) the undue 
allurement or coercion of competitors’ customers; (4) the undue 
exploitation of a bargaining position against other parties involved in the 
transaction; (5) placing undue restrictions on any business activities of 
other parties; (6) any undue offering of financial or other types of support 
to specially related persons or other enterprises; and (7) activities other 
than those defined in the preceding subsections that may hamper free 
trade.27 
The Fair Trade Act prohibits resale price maintenance as a specific 
type of unfair business practice or vertical restraint.28 This provision is 
automatically exempt without exception for publications specified by the 
Copyright Act.29 In addition, the provision may not be applied to 
commodities that meet the following conditions: (1) their qualities easily 
can be recognized as being identical; (2) they are for daily use by general 
consumers; and (3) free competition prevails in their respective markets.30 
The Fair Trade Act expands these restrictions to unreasonable 
collaborative activities and unfair business practices between trade 
associations and their member firms by: (1) prohibiting trade associations 
from restricting the number of present or future member firms in a given 
area of trade; (2) unreasonably restricting other member firms’ business 
activities; and (3) forcing members to commit unfair business practices or 
resale price maintenance.31 
As part of Korean fair trade policy, the KFTC administers the Fair 
Subcontracting Transactions Act of 1984 (FST).32 The Korean government 
introduced the FST to incorporate and strengthen related provisions in 
 26. See id. art. 19(2). 
 27. Id. art. 23(1). The KFTC transferred the former regulation against false or misleading 
labeling and advertising to the Fair Labeling and Advertising Act, Law No. 5814 of 1999. 
 28. See Fair Trade Act arts. 29-32. By 1999, the FTC had corrected 139 cases involving resale 
price maintenance provision violations without granting a single exemption. KFTC, supra note 2, at 
487. 
 29. See Fair Trade Act art. 29(2). 
 30. Id. art. 29(2), §§ 1-3. 
 31. Id. art. 26(1), §§ 1-4. By the end of 1998, there were a total of 6,313 trade associations in 
Korea. From 1981 until 2000, the government corrected 838 violations of the Fair Trade Act 
committed by trade associations. KFTC, supra note 2, at 838. 
 32. Fair Subcontracting Transactions Act, Law No. 3779 of 1984. 
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various competition laws, including the Fair Trade Act. The major 
strength of the FST is that it protects virtually all small and medium-sized 
firms in weaker bargaining positions from unfair business practices by 
larger firms in subcontracting relationships.  
The KFTC plays a unique role in enhancing the efficacy of Korean 
competition policy by requiring other government authorities to consult 
with the KFTC if they wish to introduce, amend, or enact any laws, 
decrees, or administrative measures that may restrain competition. From 
1981 to 2000, government authorities consulted with the KFTC on 3,789 
separate proposed legislation or alterations, of which the KFTC corrected 
685.33 Through such consultation, each department of the Korean 
government has been able to better understand and abide by the principles 
of fair and free competition in formulating and enforcing its respective 
policies. 
III. KOREAN ECONOMIC DEREGULATION 
In tandem with fair trade policy, economic deregulation constitutes 
another pillar of Korean competition policy. Desiring rapid economic 
growth, the Korean government licensed a small number of firms to enter 
into particular markets, and then supported their growth by guaranteeing 
them monopolistic or oligopolistic positions in their respective markets. 
This government regulation served its purpose rather effectively in the 
early stages of economic development because the Korean economy was 
small and the capabilities of the private sector had not yet matured. 
However, as the economy expanded and the private sector began to 
mature, this government intervention in the economy began to hamper 
efficient business activities. Regulations originally justified by market 
failures eventually gave rise to government failures in that most 
regulations, once introduced, continued indefinitely, leading to cooptation 
between the regulators and the regulated businesses. This level of 
economic inefficiency soon led the Korean public to increase pressure on 
the government for wholesale economic deregulation. Economic 
regulation had lost what little public support it had ever had, for the 
Korean public widely acknowledged it as the primary cause of corruption 
and political scandals in the Korean government. 
The Korean government responded to this public discord in the early 
1980s by attempting to improve the regulatory system, but its efforts were 
 33. KFTC, supra note 2, at 136-38. 
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only partially effective as the government only worked to reduce the 
volume of associated red tape and paperwork. It was only in 1988 that the 
Korean government began deregulating industries on a vast scale. 
However, by 1995, the Administrative Reform Commission was 
implementing deregulation sporadically, as it had begun to focus primarily 
on select regulations that had a more significant and far-reaching impact 
on the economy.34 In 1997, under the Basic Act for Administrative 
Regulations, the government created the Regulatory Reform Committee to 
scrutinize existing regulations and remove any harmful or unnecessary 
regulations still under law.35  
A salient feature of the deregulation process in Korea is that virtually 
every segment of Korean society has advocated the need for regulatory 
reform. Nevertheless, each segment maintains a differing view on 
deregulation and how it should be conducted. As a consequence, the 
government has enforced deregulation mostly in areas in which the 
government and private industry have no acutely conflicting interests 
without fully challenging the institutional barriers to entry and exit, which 
remain the most potent forms of regulation that hinder free competition. In 
essence, regulatory reform did not have the effect on the Korean economy 
that everyone thought it would.  
Deregulation must go hand in hand with fair trade policy; otherwise, 
the market mechanism cannot perform its proper role. The government 
designed the Fair Trade Act to encourage individual initiative rather than 
constrain it, but many Korean business circles still consider the Fair Trade 
Act to be a form of government regulation.36 This is a viewpoint that 
recently has gained significant support from Korea’s population at-large. 
In order for regulatory reform to bear fruit and be truly effective, the 
government must redefine its proper regulatory role in a clear and 
unambiguous manner. 
Even if the Korean government prepares a detailed regulatory or 
deregulatory program, successful enforcement would not necessarily 
 34. Examples of these high impact regulations include the Foreign Investment Promotion Act, 
Law No. 5559 of 1998, and the Industrial Placement and Factory Construction Act, Law No. 5827 of 
1999. 
 35. See Basic Act for Administrative Regulations of 1997 art. 6. 
 36. For example, the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) has argued consistently for the 
wholesale revision of the Fair Trade Act on the grounds that most of its provisions have served simply 
to hamper the free enterprise system. In November 2001, after a long, heated debate between the 
KFTC and the Ministry of Finance and Economics (acting upon persistent demand from the FKI), the 
Korean government decided to substantially relax the constraint that the Fair Trade Act imposes on 
investments of the thirty largest chaebols, and submitted the bill to amend the Fair Trade Act to the 
National Parliament. 
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follow. Those benefiting from advantageous regulations in their respective 
markets tend to form a considerable force opposing governmental 
modification of these regulations.37 In order to successfully overcome such 
organized opposition and successfully execute deregulation, it is 
imperative that the government carefully orchestrates a two-pronged 
approach. First, the government must summon broad public support for 
particularly controversial deregulatory efforts to silence the boisterous 
voices of concerned interest groups. Second, the government must take 
concrete measures to reduce the adjustment costs of deregulation to 
affected groups.  
Ultimately, deregulation requires significant governmental 
reorganization. The government must reorganize itself on the principle of 
a “small but strong government.” A small government is one that does 
what it should do and refrains from doing what it should not do. A strong 
government is one that takes initiative to reorganize and reduce itself when 
necessary. Neither the government nor business community should believe 
that deregulation is strictly for businesses. Deregulation should be more 
than just a response to self-serving businesses. It should serve as a 
fundamental underpinning for the transformation of the entire Korean 
economy.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
It would be wise to describe the evolution of Korea’s competition 
policy as a steady progression toward the extensive economic 
liberalization commensurate with a free market economy. This progression 
is the outcome of both natural historical dynamism and deliberate choices 
in response to the changing economic environment. The economic 
environment that once justified government regulation has disappeared 
and, in one respect, free competition is now the unequivocal rule 
governing the marketplace. Moreover, competition in Korea has assumed 
a new nature driven by innovation and based on globalized business 
activity. The Korean experience suggests that a competitive economic 
order cannot develop fully apart from a democracy because their ideals 
and logic are completely intertwined. 
 37. An illustrative example is the organized resistance of pharmacists and medical doctors, 
respectively on different grounds, to the government’s plan to enforce the separation of the 
prescription and dispensation of medical drugs in the process of enlarging the national medical 
insurance system. Compromising the vested interests of both groups, the government ended up with a 
scheme that did not satisfy all of the concerned parties, including the general public. 
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Critics of deregulation argue that monopolization and regulation are 
necessary to obtain efficiency while competition and economic freedom 
tend to be wasteful in the early stages of economic development. Although 
there is some logic to this argument, eventually artificial monopolies both 
hamper economic efficiency and impede the competitive spirit that is the 
real engine of Korea’s economic growth. Rent generated by government 
intervention and appropriated by select members of society creates a 
strong incentive to form a community of interests. This results in high 
social costs that the government cannot eliminate easily in an economy 
marked by ill-functioning market mechanisms. 
Even if a country introduces a legal framework to promote 
competition, that framework is meaningless unless accompanied by 
corresponding changes in the values, perceptions, and mentality of all 
economic agents, including the government. In order to promote true, 
interminable economic freedom, the government must revise the law 
continuously to keep abreast of the evolving economic reality. It is for this 
reason that the government must review competition policy and related 
administrative practices on a consistent basis to be able to respond to ever-
changing economic and technological conditions. 
Regulatory agencies should enforce the principle of fair and free 
competition across all industries; otherwise, there will be an inefficient 
allocation of economic resources and distributive equities may be 
concurrently and irreparably harmed. The disparity among industries in 
the speed and scope of economic liberalization has the potential to create a 
major crisis, as Korea’s 1997 financial meltdown painfully demonstrated. 
With regard to Korean competition policy, the Korean government is 
concentrated on both dealing with violations of, and removing trivial 
procedural regulations from, the Fair Trade Act. However, this 
concentrated focus has led to a general failure to both reorganize key 
industries and tackle the issues surrounding chaebols. 
Even though Korean competition policy is based primarily on the Fair 
Trade Act that provides fundamental rules for market order and contains 
elements of general industrial policy, the government must recast and 
implement other industrial laws and policies according to the principles 
embodied in the Fair Trade Act. One problem issue in need of such 
coordination concerns chaebols’ dominant possession of economic power. 
The Korean government has only just begun to address this issue and has 
experienced much trial and error in its attempts to formulate a correct 
policy menu. As the Korean economy works to pursue fair and free 
competition rules, the chaebol issue will dissolve. Nevertheless, the 
significance of the chaebol issue to the future of the Korean economy 
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requires that the government properly address the issue without any 
further delay. This poses the most critical task for competition policy in 
Korea. 
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